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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: THE NEW YORK
"GOOD SAMARITAN ACT"
But a certain Samaritan . . . bound up
his wounds.'
Good Samaritan legislation, a generic
term for any law limiting the liability of a
volunteer who renders medical assistance
at the scene of an accident or emergency,
has recently been the focal point of con-
siderable debate.2 Since the enactment of
the first such law by the California Legis-
lature in 1959, 3 thirty other states have
followed course.4 New York became the
most recent by amending Section 6513 of
the Education Law, to provide that, ef-
fective September 1, 1964, any duly li-
censed physician or surgeon who volun-
tarily renders first aid or emergency treat-
ment at the scene of an accident shall not
be liable for damages for injury or death
by reason of any act or omission unless
gross negligence is established.6 The neces-
' Luke 10:33-34.
2 See, e.g., Comment, 15 MERCER L. REV. 477
(1964); Note, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 494.
3 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144.
4 Note, 13 DE PAUL L. REV. 297 (1964). In addi-
tion to the twenty-eight states herein cited, Louisi-
ana and Delaware have also enacted such legisla-
tion.
5 N.Y. EDuC. LAW § 6513(10).
6 The statute also specifically provides that the
accident or emergency must occur "outside of a
hospital, doctor's office, or any other place having
proper and necessary medical equipment," and
that the physician must provide the services "with-
out the expectation of monetary compensation."
Ibid,
sity of such legislation, the reasons for its
enactment and the probability of its suc-
cess comprise the subject of this note.
Common-law Liability
At common law there was no duty to
come to the aid of a person in peril.7 How-
ever, if an individual attempted to render
assistance he was held to the standard of
care which a reasonable man would exer-
cise under the circumstances.s This basic
distinction, the immunity from suit for
nonfeasance as contrasted with the civil
liability for misfeasance, is a fundamental
principle of the law of torts.9 Thus, "the
good Samaritan may find himself liable
where those who passed by on the other
side will not."'10 Apparently, the continu-
ally increasing number of malpractice suits
and the fear of such litigation against them
by strangers have prompted many physi-
cians to "pass by on the other side." The
object of Good Samaritan legislation is the
elimination of such fear on the part of the
physician and the encouragement of such
emergency treatment."
7RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 314 (1938).
8ld. § 324(a).
0 The exceptions to this rule are those cases in
which the courts have found a special relationship
between the parties such as master-servant, land-
lord-tenant, and common carrier-passenger. PRos-
SER, TORTS § 54 at 334-35 (2d ed. 1955).
1l Id. § 38 at 186.
11 "Frequently persons receive no emergency care
when needed, because persons licensed to practice
the healing arts or render services ancillary there-
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Frequency of Malpractice Actions
Is the fear of a malpractice action in an
emergency situation actual or, rather, does
it exist merely in the psyche of the phy-
sician? The number of malpractice actions
has generally increased; 1" 17.8 per cent of
all physicians now practicing have been
involved in malpractice actions as com-
pared to 14.1 per cent in 1956.13 "There
can be no doubt that physicians are often
reluctant to volunteer emergency care, be-
cause of the possibility of a legal action
against them by a total stranger.' 1 4 The
results of a poll conducted by the Medical
Tribune demonstrated that fifty per cent of
all doctors interviewed said they would not
render assistance to an accident victim
lying in the road, citing fear of legal re-
prisals as their reason. 1 5 Yet, there is not
a single appellate court case in which a
physician has been found guilty of mal-
practice as a result of aid rendered at the
scene of an emergency.'0
to at the scene of an accident or emergency are
fearful their actions taken in good faith to care
for the injured person might subsequently subject
them to civil suit. The purpose of this bill is to
encourage the rendering of aid to injured persons
at the scene of an accident or emergency without
fear of civil liability." Introductory Statement,
N.J. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 140.
12 "The real danger . . . is the huge number of
professional liability claims and suits which are
not justly founded. It is this situation which causes
a doctor on occasion to be overly conscious of
litigation .... 152 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25, 1964, p. 4,
col. 3.
13 Law Department, AMA, First Results: 1963
Professional-Liability Survey, 189 A.M.A.J. 859
(1964).
14 STETLER & MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND
THE LAW 334 (4th ed. 1962).
15 Newsweek, Sept. 4, 1961, p. 41.
16 Note, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 817 (1963); Note,
There is the inherent possibility of a
malpractice action whenever a physician
acts in his professional capacity. The ele-
ments of a malpractice action are identical
to those of any civil negligence action, viz.,
duty, breach, proximate cause, and dam-
ages.1 7 The establishing of a breach of
duty is the prospective plaintiff's most
formidable task. In the law of negligence,
"duty" refers to a legal obligation to con-
form to a particular standard of care under
the circumstances.' 8 In the case of a phy-
sician, the particular standard to which he
is held must conform to that degree of care
exercised by other doctors practicing in the
same locality'9 or community. 20 The key
to the requirement of duty can be found
in the phrase "under the circumstances."
In an emergency, a volunteer "cannot be
held to the same conduct as one who has
had an opportunity to reflect, even though
it later appears that he made the wrong
decision,""-21 since the greater the emer-
gency, the less time there is for reflection.
A mere error of judgment is not negli-
gence " and for such error no liability will
supra note 2, at 498. Apparently the reason for
the enactment of the first Good Samaritan statute
in California was a single incident of a woman
left unattended on a ski slope even though physi-
cians were in the area. Kearney, Why Doctors
Are "Bad" Samaritans, Reader's Digest, May
1963, p. 89.
17 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 35.
18 Id. § 36.
19 Hanson v. Thelan, 42 N.D. 617, 173 N.W. 457
(1919).
2 ,Sinz v. Owens, 205 P.2d 3, 5-6 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1949).
21 PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 9, § 32 at 137;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 296 (1938).
"2Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E.
760, 762 (1898).
accrue. 23 In any event, to be held liable the
physician must actually compound the in-
jury.2 4 Thus, at common law, the standard
of care required of the physician may be so
minimal under the circumstances that
proof of a breach of duty will be difficult,
if not impossible; correspondingly, the
possibility of a successful malpractice ac-
tion seems remote.2 5
Moreover, it is quite difficult for the
plaintiff to obtain the expert testimony re-
quired in a malpractice action because
most doctors are reluctant to so testify. 26
The common belief that there is a great
number of malpractice claims against
"Good Samaritan" physicians is not sup-
ported by the facts. The amount of pro-
tection afforded the physician at common
law, due in part to the difficulty of estab-
lishing a breach of duty, is reflected by the
absence of reported cases. It seems reason-
able to conclude, therefore, that this
marked absence shows the alleged fears
of the physician to be without substantial
merit.
Malpractice Insurance
The increasing number of general mal-
23 Linn v. Piersol, 37 Cal. App. 171, 173, 173 Pac.
763, 764 (1918).
24 United States v. De Vane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th
Cir. 1962).
25 "Nor do I entertain any doubt but that the
courts of the State, in such an action, would take
into consideration all of the attendant circum-
stances and would not permit the unfair treat-
ment of a physician who had responded to such
an emergency." Message of Governor Otto Ker-
ner, vetoing 111. House Bill 1489 (Good Samari-
tan Bill), Aug. 26, 1963.
26 "In most cases there are several choices of
treatment available, and therefore for one doctor,
with the benefit of hindsight, to brand the work
of another as malpractice is often beyond the pale
of good conscience." 152 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25,
1964, p. 4, col. 1.
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practice claims has resulted in a concur-
rent expansion in the use of malpractice
insurance. On a nationwide basis, 94.3
per cent of all physicians have such insur-
ance; 27 of these, 78.1 per cent maintain
coverage of 50,000 dollars or more, with
the majority (57.7 per cent) being covered
to the extent of 50,000 to 100,000 dol-
lars .2  The cost of such insurance is not
excessive 29 and, in any event, it is passed
on to the patient through higher medical
bills. 0 Since the risk has been shifted from
the individual physician to the insurance
carrier, the physician does not fail to re-
spond in emergencies because of a fear
of monetary liability.
It would seem that this increase in in-
surance coverage would decrease the num-
ber of reported claims, and perhaps cam-
ouflage those instances in which a physi-
cian has been negligent at the scene of an
accident. It is to the advantage of all three
parties, viz., the injured, the doctor and
the insurer, to reach an out-of-court settle-
ment. The claimant benefits in that he is
not faced with the arduous task of proving
a breach of a duty. The advantage to the
physician is dual: (1) there is no adverse
publicity from litigation, and (2) he need
27 Law Department, supra note 13, at 862.
2 Id. at 863.
20 "According to the Physicians', Surgeons', and
Dentists' Professional Liability Manual . . . phy-
sicians may obtain coverage of $100,000 per claim
and $300,000 in the aggregate for a one year per-
iod for a premium ranging from approximately
$50 to $200, depending on the services provided
by the physician." Note, 41 NEB. L. REv. 609,
614 n.27 (1962).
30 There is a direct correlation between those
states which have the most malpractice suits and
those states in which physicians charge the high-
est fees. De Noyer, The Doctor's Dilemma, Traf-
fic Safety, Feb. 1963, p. 8, 10.
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not fear the remote possibility of an ad-
verse decision. The insurance company
benefits since, if the plaintiff reaches a
jury, there is the possibility of a substan-
tial judgment.
However, under most policies the phy-
sician must agree to the settlement and
it has been observed time and again . ..
that unless the case against the doctor is
so overwhelming that he has no possible
defense, he and his insurance carrier are
prone to go through with a trial of the case
because of the possible implication, if
the case is settled, of the possible admission
thereby that the dector [sic] did something
wrong professionally in the care and treat-
ment of the patient-claimant. 31
Constitutional Objections
The New York "Good Samaritan Act"
is in derogation of the common law to the
extent that it deprives an injured victim
of his common-law action in negligence
against the physician. The standard of
ordinary care has been replaced by a mini-
mum standard immunizing the physician
from liability for all but gross negligence.
Because of this deprivation the statute is
open to constitutional attack-as a general
rule, a legislature is prohibited from
abolishing a common-law remedy for in-
jury to person or property. 32 However,
"the Constitution does not forbid the crea-
tion of new rights, or the abolition of old
ones recognized by the common law, to
attain a permissible legislative object. ' 3 3
31 152 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 1964, p. 4, col. 3.
32Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332
(1933). However, there are exceptions to this
rule; for example, New York has abolished the
actions of seduction, alienation of affections, and
breach of promise to marry.
33Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929);
therein the Court upheld the constitutionality of
an automobile guest statute.
Any action by a state in limiting lia-
bility must be justified under the concept
of the police power. The test applied to
the exercise of such power in order to de-
termine its validity is the relationship be-
tween its effect on society and the burden
imposed on the individual. 4 In regard to
the "Good Samaritan Act," its basic intent
is to encourage physicians to give assist-
ance where they formerly would not. If
this objective is not accomplished, the legal
detriment imposed on an individual who is
harmed by a negligent physician would
surely outweigh any benefit to society. 35
Certainly there is a "rational tendency
to promote the safety ... and general wel-
fare of the public." 3 Since the act on its
face is neither arbitrary, capricious nor
unreasonable, 37 its constitutional validity
will depend primarily on its effectiveness in
motivating the physician, formerly hesitant
because of the fear of legal action, to
render assistance. 8 Consequently, if there
is no substantial increase in assistance by
physicians, the statute may be unconstitu-
tional in that it merely deprives the victim
3 Miller v. Schoene, 376 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928).
35 This should in no way be interpreted as an in-
dorsement of all Good Samaritan legislation.
Many problems arise under (1) those statutes
which provide protection for other than physi-
cians, and (2) those which make no provision for
excluding gross negligence.
36 Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 887
(Mass. 1948).
37 There remains the possibility that Good Samari-
tan legislation "may be construed to be class legis-
lation and thus in violation of the special privi-
leges and immunities provisions of many state
constitutions." STETLER & MORITZ, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 335.
38 "The police power may be exerted ...only
when such legislation bears a real and substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or
some other phase of the general welfare." Liggett
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928).
of a remedy with no perceptible contrasting
benefit to society.
The question then arises as to the spe-
cific effect of the New York statute. As
has been demonstrated, the purpose of the
act is not to limit the liability of physicians,
but rather to increase the possibility of
their responding in emergency situations.
Yet, whether a doctor will voluntarily be-
come a Good Samaritan or, rather, con-
tinue to "pass by on the other side," re-
mains extremely doubtful.
The physician or surgeon appearing at
the scene of an accident or emergency is
now faced with a perplexing problem. On
the one hand, does the statute afford him
sufficient protection as to eliminate the
fear of legal retribution? On the other
hand, is he morally obligated to stop?3 9
The apparent effect of the "Good Samari-
tan Act" will be to so limit the liability
of the physician as to make the possibility
of a successful malpractice action quite re-
mote. In reality, it may very well be that
the physician does not fear the successful
action as much as he fears the inception of
any action.4 0 Since virtually all physicians
carry malpractice insurance, it would seem
fair to hypothesize that they do not fear
the personal financial liability, but rather the
notoriety and ill will engendered by any
litigation. As the statute does not eliminate
the liability of the physician in the case of
39 "If the present trend continues and if a physi-
cian must become increasingly apprehensive of
legal suits, his own aggressive instinct will in-
evitably, in some measure, overcome his humani-
tarian and professional motivations." 152
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25, 1964, p. 4, col. 3.
40 "There is no more humiliating and terrifying
ordeal for the professional man than the ordeal
of a trial in which he must defend his professional
competence and reputation, even though he does
so successfully." Id. at col. 4.
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gross negligence a factual determination
will often have to be made by a jury as
to whether the acts of the physician were
of such magnitude. Therefore, whether the
standard is one of gross negligence or
ordinary negligence, this fear of the phy-
sician will not be alleviated. The mere fact
that the plaintiff will have even less chance
of recovering will not eliminate the appre-
hension and corresponding failure to
render emergency aid on the part of the
physician.
In addition, a preliminary survey by the
Legal Department of the American Medi-
cal Association indicates that physicians
are not more likely to respond in emer-
gency situations in those states which have
enacted Good Samaritan legislation.41 In
replying to the query "does fear of a claim
make you unwilling to furnish emergency
medical care, away from your office or
hospital, to a stranger injured in an acci-
dent or stricken with a sudden illness?,"
fifty per cent of all physicians answered
""yes .'42 In those states which had not en-
acted Good Samaritan laws, 52.3 per cent
said "yes," while in those states which had
such laws, 48.5 per cent answered affirma-
tively.43 These statistics indicate that the
legislative goals have not been accom-
plished since the laws have not been effec-
tive in encouraging physicians to render
assistance. Thus it is possible to conclude
that the protection from liability afforded
the physician by the statute will not sub-
stantially increase the possibility of his re-
sponding in an emergency situation.
41 Law Department, AMA, First Results: 1963
Professional-Liability Survey, 189 A.M.A.J. 859,
865 (1964).
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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Other Objections and Alternatives
It has been suggested that in order to
encourage assistance in emergency situa-
tions the legislature should impose an af-
firmative duty to render aid, rather than
eliminate the physician's liability.44 The
concept of an affirmative duty is not com-
pletely foreign to the law of negligence;
many states already impose a duty upon
those involved in automobile accidents to
render aid to the injured.4 ' As early as
1908 it was suggested that "one who fails
to interfere to save another from impending
death or great bodily harm, when he might
do so with little or no inconvenience to
himself . . . shall be punished criminally
and shall make compensation to the party
injured .... -46 However, such a rule would
seem impractical from the standpoint of
enforcibility. In most cases it would be
impossible to factually determine whether
someone did "pass by on the other side."
Moreover, such an obligation would not
fall within the traditional concept of duty:
The expression 'duty' properly imports a
determinate person to whom the obligation
is owing as well as the one who owes that
obligation. There must be two determinate
parties before the relationship of obligor
and obligee of a duty can exist.47
However, this concept may be in the
process of modification. In denying sum-
mary judgment the court in Wilmington
Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove 4 8 declared that the
44See generally Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV.
L. REV. 97 (1908).
45 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 135 (1958);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2319 (1957); TEX. PEN.
CODE art. 1150 (1961).
4G Ames, supra note 44, at 113.
47 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
94 (1906).
48 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961).
liability of a hospital may be predicated on
its refusal to render aid in the case of an
unmistakable emergency. The plaintiff had
taken his infant to the emergency ward of
a private hospital. The hospital refused to
treat the child on the ground that he was
at the time under the care of a physician.
Shortly thereafter the child died. The court
rejected the principle that a private hos-
pital could choose its patients and stated
that a hospital may be liable if negligence
in not recognizing an emergency may be
established. It is not inconceivable that in
the future the courts may determine that a
physician, because of his special position
in society, does in fact owe an affirmative
duty to assist injured members of that
society.
We should not fail to realize, however,
that in the moral realm an affirmative duty
to act on the part of the physician may
already exist. The physician is bound by
the Hippocratic Oath to render medical aid
to his fellow man. Also, he is ethically
bound by the Principles of Medical Ethics:
"A physician may choose whom he will
serve. In an emergency, however, he
should render assistance to the best of
his ability. '49 The physician who is already
ethically bound by the precepts of his pro-
fessional oath and by the tenets of his own
American Medical Association has never-
theless failed to respond. It is doubtful
whether the immunity granted by the stat-
ute will be more successful in encouraging
the physician to respond. Furthermore, the
stature of the physician in the public eye
is not enhanced by the enforcement of an
ethical obligation through the elimination
of a legal one.
One may question the wisdom of a stat-
49 AMA Principles of Medical Ethics § 5.
ute which exempts from liability for neg-
ligence the one group which is trained to
react in an emergency. 0 If the intent of the
legislature was to encourage aid, why did
it not extend the aegis of the statute to
everyone? Of course, those opposing such
a pervasive statute would argue that it is
only the physician who should react and
that in many instances no treatment at
all is preferable to improper assistance
rendered by a layman. The fact remains,
however, that physicians trained to react
and under a moral and ethical duty to
respond are given preference over the non-
physician who does respond with only the
best intentions.
The essential unfairness of this type of
statute [limited to physicians] can be ap-
preciated when it is considered that any
private citizen untrained in first aid, who
volunteers in an emergency may be held
legally accountable for his actions, as may
a nurse who is less trained than the phy-
sician. But, the doctor, who is the only one
fully trained to render emergency care,
would be the very one rendered immune
by this Bill from the consequences of his
negligent acts.51
Conclusion
Theoretically, there can be no question
that the major benefit of the "Good Samar-
itan Act" will inure to the injured party
who, but for the enactment of such legisla-
50 Norman Welch, former president of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, has stated: "I subscribe
wholeheartedly to the principle that doctors in
common with other people should be held re-
sponsible for damages due to their own acts of
negligence." 152 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1964, p. 4,
col. 3. It should be noted that this comment was
made within the context of an argument against
absolute liability for doctors.
5' Message of Governor Otto Kerner, vetoing 111.
House Bill 1489 (Good Samaritan Bill), Aug.
26, 1963.
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tion, would go unaided. But what of the
concededly atypical situation wherein the
injured party is treated incompetently by
a physician who negligently compounds
the injury? Who can better bear the risk-
the injured party who now has no re-
course to the courts for compensation, or
the physician fully protected by liability
insurance? 52
One can see the many factors militating
in opposition to Good Samaritan legisla-
tion:
(1) the high degree of improbability of a
successful malpractice action, as evi-
denced by the lack of reported cases;
(2) the shifting burden of liability as a
result of malpractice insurance;
(3) the possible constitutional deficiency;
(4) the fact that such statutes have had
little effect in other states; and
(5) the other moral and ethical pressures
already operating on the physician.
These must be carefully weighed against
the concern of a legislature to ensure the
safety of its citizens. Certainly, a statute
which encourages even one physician to
render assistance where he normally would
not because of fear of legal action cannot
be completely without merit.
52 "Facing the facts, it must be remembered that
there are cases of actual malpractice in which a
patient suffers injury as a result of accidents or
carelessness or ignorance on the part of the phy-
sician. It has never been, nor will it ever become,
our purpose to try to avoid responsibility for the
physician in these cases. The persons injured as
a result of such accidents or inefficiency have a
right to be and should be compensated. That is
why physicians carry professional liability insur-
ance. It is one of the obvious results and dangers
involved in the admittedly hazardous job of prac-
ticing medicine." 152 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 25, 1964, p.
4, col. 2.
